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 Do We Need Partial Intentions? 
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Abstract: Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of 
intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate 
because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally 
permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same 
end.  Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the 
adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent 
in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them a pair of partial 
intentions.  I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, (i) Holton has yet to 
offer us an actual account of partial intentions, and (ii) that the traditional 
account of intentions already has the resources necessary to accommodate dual-
plan cases.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In his paper, “Partial Belief, Partial Intention,” Richard Holton argues that we must 
posit the existence of partial intentions in order to make sense of certain kinds of cases; 
namely, ones in which an agent’s uncertainty about achieving an end in one way 
prompts her to form a second, mutually exclusive, back-up plan for achieving the same 
end in some other way.  Let us call such cases dual-plan cases.  According to Holton, 
dual-plan cases reveal that the traditional account of intention—which only posits the 
existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate.  This is because the consistency norms 
governing all-out intentions prohibits the adoption of competing (i.e., mutually 
exclusive) intentions.  However, the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational.  
Moreover, by Holton’s lights, we can only make sense of why the agent in a dual-plan 
case is not being irrational if we attribute to them a partial intention.   
In this paper, I advance two separate lines of argument against Holton’s 
conclusion.  First, I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, Holton has not yet 
offered us an account of partial intentions.  This is not so much a criticism of the notion 
of partial intentions per se as it is the claim that there is no account of partial intentions 
on offer in Holton’s paper.   This is surprising since Holton takes himself to be offering 
just such an account.  Second, I argue that the traditional account of intention (i.e., one 
that does not include partial intentions) has the resources necessary to deal with dual-
plan cases.   Hence, even if an account of partial intentions could be given at some 
point in the future, Holton would have failed to show that there is a need for such an 
account.   
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I begin my investigation by considering three proposals for analysing dual-plan 
cases—what I refer to as (i) the all-out intention analysis, (ii) the disjunctive intention 
analysis, and (iii) the conditional intention analysis.  I argue that all three fail to meet 
Holton’s challenge.  I will then turn my attention to the partial intention analysis (which 
is my name for Holton’s account).  I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, Holton 
has not really given us an account of partial intentions.  Finally, I put forward my own 
analysis—the intending to try analysis—and argue that it has the resources necessary to 
meet Holton’s challenge.  If my argument succeeds, it would follow that the traditional 
account of intention already has the resources necessary to accommodate dual-plan 
cases; there is therefore no need to posit the existence of partial intentions to handle 
such cases. 
 
 
2. The All-Out Intention Analysis 
 
Holton gives the following example of what I have been calling a dual-plan case1:  
 
OVERDUE BOOKS 
You have some library books that are badly overdue; in fact so badly overdue 
that your borrowing privileges are about to be suspended (a major 
inconvenience) if you do not return or renew them by the end of the day.  Since 
you have finished with them, the best thing would be to drop them off at the 
library on your way home; but that is after the departmental seminar, and you 
know that, once you get on your bike with your head full of ideas from the 
discussion, you are all too likely to cycle straight home.  Alternatively, you 
could renew them online; but that would require your library password, which 
is scribbled on a piece of paper lying somewhere on your desk at home.  If you 
renewed them online you would not need to take the books home with you, but 
you would need to take your laptop, which you would otherwise leave at work.  
In the end you head for the seminar with your bag weighed down by both the 
library books and your laptop, moved by the thought that you will avoid 
suspension one way or another.2 
 
One distinctive feature of OVERDUE BOOKS is that it seems as though it would be 
irrational for the agent described in the example (let us call him Richard) to 
deliberately refrain from packing the books and laptop, given his dual plans.   This is a 
wide scope requirement.  Richard is rationally required to pack the books and his 
laptop so long as he continues to have the dual plans of returning and renewing the 
books.  He may discharge this requirement by either adopting the intention to pack the 
books and laptop, or by giving up on one or both of his plans.  However, should he 
                                                
1 Among action theorists, the expression “plan” is a term of art, with various technical meanings and 
2 Holton (2008: 28-29). 
Penultimate Draft. Please Cite Published Version 
 3 
continue to have the plan to return the books and the (backup) plan to renew the books 
online, it seems as though it would be irrational for Richard to decide not to pack his 
books and laptop.  
Admittedly, we can imagine a scenario in which Richard, after reflecting on his 
tendency to forget to do things after department talks, simply decides to give up on the 
plan of returning the books and settles on the plan of renewing the books.  So 
described, it would not be rationally required that Richard pack the books in his bag.   
But describing Richard in this way would be to change Holton’s example.   As 
described by Holton, Richard does in fact plan to return the books.  Given this plan, it 
would be irrational for Richard to decide not to pack the books.  The point also applies 
to Richard’s decision to pack his laptop.  It would be irrational for Richard to decide 
not to pack his laptop, so long as he has the (backup) plan of renewing the books 
online.  In short, so long as Richard has the plan to return the books and the (backup) 
plan to renew the books online, it would be irrational for him not to pack both his 
books and laptop.  If an account of dual-plan cases is going to be satisfactory, it must 
preserve this idea.  
One way we may attempt to make sense of OVERDUE BOOKS is by claiming that 
Richard has an all-out intention to return the books and an all-out intention to renew 
the books, where an all-out intention is simply the standard kind of intention discussed 
in the action theory literature.   Call this the all-out intention analysis.  The main strength 
of the all-out intention analysis is that it explains why Richard is rationally required to 
pack both the books and the laptop, so long as he continues to have the dual plans of 
returning and renewing the books. 3   Simply put, by adopting a pair of all-out 
intentions, Richard is subject to something along the lines of the following Means-End 
Coherence requirement: 
 
Means-End Coherence:  
Rationality requires that [if one intends X, and believes that one will achieve X only 
if one intends Y, then one intends Y].  
 
According to Means-End Coherence, rationality requires that if Richard intends to 
return the books (which, according to the all-out intention analysis, he does) and 
believes that he will achieve his goal of returning the books only if he intends to pack 
them in his bag (which, as stipulated in our example, he does), then he must intend to 
pack the books in his bag.  Since deciding not to pack the books would be inconsistent 
with intending to pack them, this explains why Richard would be irrational if he 
decided not to pack the books.  
Unfortunately, the all-out intention analysis suffers from at least one fatal 
weakness: it is unable to preserve the intuition that Richard is not being irrational 
when he adopts the dual plans.  Given that returning the books to the library precludes 
renewing the books online, it would be irrational for Richard to all-out intend to bring 
                                                
3 I will henceforth leave the “so long as he continues to have the dual plans” qualification implicit. 
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about both ends.  Richard would be violating something along the lines of the 
following consistency principle: 
 
Intention Consistency: 
Rationality requires that [if one intends X, and believes that X entails ¬Y, then one 
not intend Y]. 
 
Hence, if we were to adopt the all-out intention analysis, we would find ourselves 
unable to preserve the intuition that Richard is not being irrational. 
The lesson to be learned from the failure of the all-out intention analysis is that a 
satisfactory account of dual-plan cases must balance two goals: it must explain why it 
would be irrational for Richard to decide not to pack his books or laptop, while also 
preserving the intuition that Richard is not being irrational for having a pair of 
mutually exclusive plans.  These goals seem to pull in opposite directions.  Saying that 
Richard would be irrational if he decided not to pack his books or laptop pushes us 
towards saying that his dual plans represent competing intentions.  However, saying 
that Richard is not being irrational by having the dual plans pushes us towards saying 
that his dual plans are not competing intentions after all. 
 
 
3.  The Disjunctive Intention Analysis 
 
A second way of making sense of OVERDUE BOOKS is by claiming that Richard has a 
single intention with the disjunctive content: “return or renew the books”.  Call this the 
disjunctive intention analysis.  If we let [Return] stand for “return the books to the 
library” and [Renew] stand for “renew the books online when one gets home”, then the 
content of Richard’s intention, according to the disjunctive analysis, may be 
represented thus:  
 
(A) Intend ([Return] ∨ [Renew])   
 
The strength of the disjunctive intention analysis is that it preserves the intuition that 
Richard is not guilty of any irrationality.  Just as it is rationally permissible to believe a 
disjunction in which the disjuncts are not compossible—e.g., P ∨ ¬P—it is rationally 
permissible to intend a disjunction—i.e., [Return] ∨ [Renew]—in which the disjuncts 
are not compossible.  Thus, if we hold that Richard has a disjunctive intention to return 
or renew the books, the fact that returning the books precludes renewing the books 
does not entail any irrationality on Richard’s part.   
The main weakness of the disjunctive intention analysis is that it fails to preserve 
the intuition that Richard would be irrational if he decided not to pack his books or 
decided not to pack his laptop.  According to Means-End Coherence, rationality 
requires that, insofar as Richard has the end of returning the books, and believes that 
achieving this end requires intending to pack the books in his bag, he intend to pack 
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the books.  But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Richard has a disjunctive 
intention to return or renew the books.  Packing the books is not necessary for 
satisfying the disjunctive intention.  Hence, if he is rational, Richard will not believe 
that packing the books is necessary for satisfying the disjunctive end of returning or 
renewing them.  Consequently, Means-End Coherence would fail to require that 
Richard intend to pack the books if he intends to return or renew the books.  An 
analogous, but independent, argument can be advanced to show that Richard is not 
rationally required to pack his laptop.  The upshot is that the disjunctive intention 
account fails to explain why Richard would be irrational if he decided not to pack the 
books or laptop.  
 
 
4.  The Conditional Intention Analysis 
 
A third option for making sense of OVERDUE BOOKS would be to say that Richard has a 
conditional intention to renew the books.  On this view, Richard has an all-out 
intention to return the books and a conditional intention to renew the books if he fails 
to return them.  Call this the conditional intention analysis.  One strength of the 
conditional intention analysis is that it preserves the intuition that Richard is not being 
irrational.  According to the conditional intention analysis, Richard has the following 
two intentions:  
 
(B) Intend ([Return]) 
(C) Intend (¬[Return] ⊃ [Renew]) 
 
Since there is no inconsistency between intentions (B) and (C), attributing (B) and (C) to 
Richard preserves the intuition that Richard is not being irrational.  
Unfortunately, the conditional intentional analysis is subject to much the same 
objection as the disjunctive intention analysis.  Given the logical equivalence ‘¬P ⊃ Q ≡ 
P ∨ Q’,  it follows that (C) is equivalent to:  
 
(A) Intend ([Return] ∨ [Renew])   
 
We are now back to the disjunctive account discussed earlier, except that Richard has 
an additional intention with the content [Return].  Hence, Richard has the following 
pair of intentions: 
 
(A) Intend ([Return] ∨ [Renew])   
(B) Intend ([Return]) 
 
The upshot is that we are unable to preserve the intuition that Richard would be 
irrational if he decided not to pack his laptop.  There is no rational pressure on Richard 
to pack the laptop because the disjunction is already being made true by his intending 
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the first disjunct.  That is to say, the disjunctive intention, (A), is already being satisfied 
by (B), Richard’s intention to return the books.  It is therefore false that Richard 
believes that packing the laptop is necessary for returning or renewing the books, and 
(a fortiori) Richard does not believe that packing the laptop is necessary for returning 
the books (i.e., satisfying the first disjunct).   We are therefore left without the 
theoretical resources necessary for explaining why it would be irrational for Richard to 
decide not to pack the laptop. 
I do not take the three analyses of OVERDUE BOOKS just limned to be exhaustive.  
Indeed, in the next section, I will put forward my own analysis and I am sure there are 
others that can be given.  My aim in the preceding discussion has been to convey some 
sense of the dialectical terrain that motivates Holton’s partial intention analysis.   The 
challenge that the partial intention analysis sets out to meet is that of explaining how it 
could both be true that Richard is not being irrational for having a pair of mutually 
exclusive plans while also preserving the idea that it would be irrational for Richard to 
decide not to pack his books or laptop. 
 
 
5. The Partial Intention Analysis 
 
We now turn our attention to Holton’s proposed analysis of OVERDUE BOOKS, what I 
refer to as the partial intention analysis.  According to Holton, a partial intention stands 
in the same relation to an all-out intention as a partial belief stands to an all-out belief.  
Let us therefore begin with Holton’s definitions of an all-out belief and a partial belief:  
 
All-out Belief  
One all-out believes P iff one takes P as a live possibility and does not take ¬P as a 
live possibility.  
 
Partial Belief 
One partially believes P iff one takes P as a live possibility and takes ¬P as a live 
possibility.4  
 
What distinguishes a partial belief from an all-out belief is that the former involves 
taking both P and ¬P as live possibilities.  This means, according to Holton, that a 
partial belief in P is automatically accompanied by a partial belief in ¬P.  Holton aims 
to preserve this aspect of partial belief in his account of partial intentions.  However, 
Holton observes that in the case of partial intentions, the second intention does not 
come for free, as it does in the case of belief.5  Instead, we must look to cases in which 
an agent has two competing plans to bring about some end, and intends the actions 
                                                
4 Holton (2008: 39) 
5 Holton (2008: 40-43). 
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necessary for both.  This leads Holton to define a partial intention as one that is 
accompanied by an alternative intention towards the same end:  
  
Partial Intention  
An intention to bring about P is partial iff it is designed to achieve a given end E 
and it is accompanied by one or more alternative intentions also designed to 
achieve E.6  
 
One strength of the partial intention analysis is that it preserves the intuition that 
Richard is not being irrational when he adopts dual plans.  Holton observes that we are 
warranted in concluding that Richard is being irrational only if we assume that partial 
intentions are to be held to the same consistency requirements as all-out beliefs.  
However, this would be to fail to treat like cases alike.  Insofar as we are here 
attributing to Richard a pair of partial intentions, then his intentions should be held to 
the same consistency requirements as partial beliefs.  Holton writes:  
 
We do not require that partial beliefs be consistent, in the sense that everything that we 
partially believe must be compossible; so we should not require this of our partial 
intentions.  Instead, we should require of our partial intentions at most the same kind of 
consistency that we require of our partial beliefs.7  
 
Holton does not go on to elaborate, but I believe his point may be illustrated as follows: 
suppose one has a partial belief with a credence of 0.45 in P.  One is rationally 
permitted to have a partial belief with a credence of 0.55 in ¬P, even though P and ¬P 
are not compossible.8  Hence, we do not require that everything an agent partially 
believes be compossible.  A similar allowance, Holton insists, should be made for 
partial intentions.  Hence, Richard may partially intend to both return and renew the 
books, despite the fact that both actions are not compossible.  The upshot is that, 
insofar as Richard partially intends to return the books and partially intends to renew 
the books online, he is not being irrational. 
A second strength of the partial intention analysis is that it appears to provide an 
explanation of why it would be irrational for Richard to decide not to pack his books 
and/or laptop.  If we assume that partial intentions are governed by Means-End 
Coherence, then rationality requires that if Richard partially intends to return the 
books, and believes that packing the books is necessary for returning the books, then 
he intend to pack the books.9  An analogous point holds with regards to Richard’s 
                                                
6 Holton (2008: 41). 
7 Holton (2008: 47). 
8 Indeed, according to the additivity axiom for credences (understood as probability functions), it would 
be irrational to intend P or ¬P to a degree less than or greater than the sum of the degree to which one 
intends P and one intends ¬P.  This means that one is not only rationally permitted to have a credence of 
0.45 towards P if one’s credence in ¬P is 0.55.  One is rationally required to do so.   
9 I should register that I have misgivings about the claim that partial intentions are subject to Means-End 
Coherence, given that they’re not subject to Intention Consistency.  Indeed, it seems to me that these two 
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partial intention to renew the books online. If this is right, then the partial intention 
analysis is able to explain why Richard would be irrational if he decided not to pack 
his books or laptop.  To do so would be to violate the Means-End Coherence 
requirement that governs partial intention.   
 
5.1. Holton’s Non-Account “Account”   
One of the most distinctive features of Holton’s account of partial intentions is that it 
requires that an agent have two or more psychologically-distinct attitudes.  Holton 
thinks that conceiving of partial intentions in this way is necessary for preserving the 
parity between partial intentions and partial beliefs.  But this seems to rest on the 
mistaken assumption that taking P and ¬P as live possibilities entails the adoption of 
two psychologically-distinct doxastic attitudes (one towards P and another towards 
¬P).  But this is not necessarily the case.  For example, I may partially believe that [I 
will get a promotion by year’s end], owing to the fact that I have less than full 
confidence that I will get the promotion, without my having a second, psychologically-
distinct, doxastic attitude towards the proposition [I will not get a promotion by year’s 
end].  Indeed, the proposition [I will not get a promotion by year’s end] may not have 
even crossed my mind.  In other words, saying that an agent who partially believes P 
takes both P and ¬P as live possibilities is to offer a formal, rather than psychological, 
characterization of partial belief; it is an attempt to capture a formal consequence of 
having an attitude that involves less than full credence in P. 
Once we register that the sense in which partially believing P entails partially 
believing ¬P is formal rather than psychological, the claim that partial beliefs involve a 
pair of doxastic attitudes can no longer serve as a basis for distinguishing between 
partial and all-out beliefs.  This is because the formal point applies equally to all-out 
beliefs.  Just as assigning a credence of 0.45 to P formally entails assigning a credence 
of 0.55 to ¬P, assigning a credence of 1 to P formally entails assigning a credence of 0 to 
¬P.  Put in non-credal terms, an all-out belief in P formally entails an all-out disbelief in 
¬P.  Hence, if we take partial beliefs to necessarily involve two distinct doxastic 
attitudes (on purely formal grounds), then parity of reasoning demands that we do the 
same for all-out beliefs.  The upshot is that the fact that partial beliefs entail the 
possession of two doxastic attitudes (one towards P and another towards ¬P) cannot 
serve as a point of contrast between partial and all-out beliefs since the same is true of 
all-out beliefs.  We therefore have no reason to assume that this should be a point of 
contrast between partial and all-out intentions.  If partial intentions really stand to all-
out intention as partial belief stands to all-out belief, as Holton claims, then we should 
expect all-out intentions to also involve two psychologically distinct attitudes.  Clearly, 
something has gone wrong with Holton’s account.   
My diagnosis of what goes wrong is that Holton’s “account” of partial intention is 
not an account of partial intention at all, but rather the description of the kind of case 
an account of partial intention should be able to explain.  To see why this is so, we may 
                                                                                                                                          
norms stand and fall together, so that any attitude that is subject to the one requirement will be subject to 
the other.  However, this is not a line of argument I will attempt to develop here. 
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begin by observing that it is possible that an agent who partially believes P may have 
two distinct psychological attitudes (one towards P and another towards ¬P).  
However, to conclude from this that we should define partial beliefs in terms of the 
possession of two doxastic attitudes would be to conflate explanans with 
explanandum.  Consider: many theorists posit the existence of partial beliefs in order 
to explain phenomenon like the preface paradox, cases in which an agent rationally 
believes (P1), believes (P2),…., believes (P100) but does not believe (P1, P2,…., P100).  
However, having a partial belief does not consist in the act of rationally believing (P1), 
believing (P2),…., believing (P100) and failing to believe (P1, P2,…., P100).  Rather the 
existence of partial beliefs is posited in order to explain how it is possible to rationally 
believe (P1), believe (P2),…., believe (P100), without also believing (P1, P2,…., P100).  
Partial belief (i.e., the explanans) is what allows us to make sense of how the preface 
paradox (i.e., the explanandum) is possible.  But having a partial belief does not 
require actually being in a preface paradox.10  Similarly, we may appeal to the notion of 
a partial belief to explain how it may be rationally permissible for an agent to have 
competing doxastic attitudes.  However, having a partial belief does not consist in 
rationally having competing doxastic attitudes.  
Analogously, partial intentions are not to be identified with cases in which it is 
rationally permissible for an agent to have competing intentions geared towards the 
same end.  Insofar as partial intentions exist, they should be what explain this 
possibility.  If this is right, then Holton’s definition of a partial intention is not a 
definition at all, but rather the description of the kind of case we would need to posit 
the existence of a partial intention to explain.  At best, what Holton offers is a potential 
explanandum, not an explanans.   There is simply no account of partial intentions on 
offer in Holton’s paper.   
 
 
6. The Intending to Try Analysis 
 
I submit that we may arrive at a satisfactory analysis of OVERDUE BOOKS by holding 
that Richard has a single intention to prevent his library privileges from being 
suspended and that he intends to try to achieve this goal in two different ways: by 
either returning the books after the seminar or renewing them online when he gets 
home.11  On the present suggestion, it is the fact that Richard intends to try to return the 
books, and believes that packing the books is necessary for trying to return the books, 
that explains why it would be irrational for Richard to decide not to pack the books, 
and it is the fact that Richard intends to try to renew the books, and believes that 
packing his laptop is necessary for trying to renew the books, that explains why it 
                                                
10 I wish to remain neutral on the question of whether the preface paradox is best explained in terms of 
partial beliefs. My claim, here, is simply that a partial belief should not be identified with the 
phenomenon it is employed to explain.  Presumably, this point also applies to would-be partial intentions. 
11 Michael Bratman (1984) employs a similar strategy to deal with his video game case. I add an 
important qualification in the final section of this paper. 
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would be irrational for Richard to decide not to pack his laptop.  Hence, the intending 
to try analysis is able to preserve the intuition that Richard would be irrational if he 
decided not to pack the books or laptop.  Moreover, even if returning the books 
precludes renewing the books online, trying to return the books does not preclude 
trying to renew the books.  Indeed, the acts of packing the books and laptop are 
instances of trying to return and renew the books, respectively, and these are obviously 
compossible states of affairs.  Hence, according to the intending to try analysis, Richard 
does not violate Intention Consistency.  It therefore preserves the intuition that Richard 
is not being irrational when he adopts the dual plans. 
One worry that may arise with respect to the present account is that the intention to 
try is not strong enough to ground Means-End Coherence.  To this end, it may be 
argued that even if Richard believes that packing the books is necessary for returning 
the books, he need not believe that doing so is necessary for intending to try to return 
books.  The efficacy of this argument will depend on the conception of trying we are 
employing.  Moreover, I believe that there is an intuitive conception of trying 
according to which intending to try is governed by Means-End Coherence.  I shall 
provide a brief sketch of just such a conception at present. 
Consider an agent, Emma, who is at an auction and is in the process of bidding on 
a particularly desirable vase.  Emma has $500 on her.  This means that it is within 
Emma’s power to bid on the vase up until the $500 mark.12  As the auctioneer 
announces a new price for the vase—$150…$250….$350…and so on—what Emma 
believes is necessary for purchasing the vase is being constantly updated.  When the 
starting price of $150 is announced, Emma comes to believe that she must bid at least 
$150 to purchase the vase.  Intuitively, if she refrains from bidding $150 (i.e., doing 
what she believes to be necessary for purchasing the vase), then she does not count as 
trying to purchase the vase.  Let us assume that Emma continues to bid up until the 
$350 mark.  However, once the announced price of the vase climbs above $350, she 
stops bidding.  At this point, it seems natural to say that Emma has stopped trying to 
purchase the vase.  Moreover, a natural description of the entire scenario seems to be 
that Emma tried to purchase the vase, but that (at a certain point) she stopped trying.  
At which point did she stop trying?  She stopped trying at the point at which she 
stopped bidding—i.e., the point at which she stopped doing what she believed to be 
necessary for purchasing the vase.   
What the above example is meant to illustrate is that there is an intuitive notion of 
trying according to which one only counts as trying to X at some time, T, if one does 
everything one can at T to X (i.e., one does everything within one’s power and that one 
believes to be necessary for X-ing).13  Such a conception of trying is strong enough to 
ground Means-End Coherence.  In our example, if Emma believes that bidding $250 at 
                                                
12 According to the conception of trying I defend, trying only requires that one do what one truly believes 
is within one’s power.  On this view, one may count as trying to X at T even though one fails to do 
something one believes to be necessary to X at T, so long as that thing is either outside of one’s power or 
one believes it is outside one’s power. Henceforth, I will leave this additional qualification implicit. 
13 For a defence of the idea that trying to X entails doing everything one can to X, see Hornsby (2010). 
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time T2 is necessary for purchasing the vase, then she only counts as trying to purchase 
the vase at T2 if she does in fact bid $250 at T2.  In short, trying to X at some time T2 
requires doing everything she can to X at T2.  Means-End Coherence, when applied to 
Emma, comes to the following claim:  
 
Means-End Coherence (Emma):  
Rationality requires that [if Emma intends to try to purchase the vase, and believes 
that bidding $250 at time T2 is necessary for trying to purchase the vase, then she 
must intend to bid $250 at time T2].   
 
Given that trying to X at some time T requires doing everything one can to X at T, it 
follows that intending to try to X makes the same Means-End Coherence demands as 
intending to X.  
 
 
7. Holton’s Objections to the Intending to Try Analysis 
 
Holton anticipates and responds to the intending to try analysis as follows:  
 
We surely would not say that you intend to try to take the library books back; it is not as 
though the library is currently under siege and you are sceptical about your abilities to 
get through the defences.  No—if you get home and find to your annoyance that the 
books are still in your bag, it will not be true that you even tried to take them back.14 
 
Unsurprisingly, I do not find Holton’s objections to the intending to try analysis 
convincing.  Two independent lines of argument may be gleaned from the preceding 
passage.  First, Holton protests that Richard cannot be said to have the intention to try 
given that he faced no external environmental obstacles—such as overcoming a library 
siege—that would prompt him to question his ability to return the books.  But why 
should the potential obstacles Richard faces be restricted to features of his external 
environment?  After all, Richard’s tendency to forget to do things after department 
seminars is as much an obstacle as any to his returning the library books.  Hence, the 
restriction to environmental obstacles seems ad hoc.   
Holton’s second rationale for thinking that Richard does not intend to try is that if 
Richard were to arrive home only to recognize that he had forgotten to return the 
books, it would be inaccurate to say that he ever tried to return them.  Holton takes it 
to follow from this that Richard never intended to try to return the books.  Holton’s 
argument presupposes that intending to try entails actually trying.  But this is not 
plausible.  If I were to suffer a stroke between my decision to kick a ball and my 
actually kicking it, it would not follow that I never had an intention to kick the ball.  I 
form the intention to do something at the point at which I resolve to do it, not at the 
point at which I begin doing it.  Likewise, I form the intention to try at the point at 
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which I resolve to try, not the point at which I actually begin trying.  The mistake 
Holton seems to make is that he assumes that because trying requires putting fort some 
kind of effort that the same is also true of intending to try.  But intending to try is a 
case of intending, not a case of trying.  Like all other cases of intending, it does not 
require that one actually do what one intends to do (or even that one put fort any effort 
towards achieving what one intends to do) in order to count as intending to do it.  In 
sum, the fact that Richard forgets to try to return the books no more entails that he 
never intended to try to return the books than someone’s forgetting to perform an 
action entails that they never intended to perform it.  
The takeaway of the preceding discussion is that Holton’s conclusion that we can 
only make sense of OVERDUE BOOKS by attributing a partial intention to Richard is 
unwarranted.  We can also make sense of OVERDUE BOOKS by saying that Richard has 
an all-out intention to try to return the books.  Consequently, the traditional conception 
of intentions already has the resources necessary to make sense of OVERDUE BOOKS and 
there is therefore no need to posit the existence of partial intentions in order to make 
sense of dual-plan cases.  
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